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O P I N I O N  
   
  
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge
 
: 
This case concerns an action by the Secretary of Labor 
(the Secretary) against James Doyle, Cynthia Holloway, and 
others, arising from their alleged breach of fiduciary duties to 
the Professional Industrial Trade Workers Union (PITWU) 
Health & Welfare Fund (Fund), a health benefit plan 
governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA).  After a bench trial, the District Court entered 
judgment for Doyle and Holloway.  The Secretary appeals the 
District Court’s judgment, contending that the District Court 
failed to adequately address its breach of fiduciary duty 
arguments and to consider whether the defendants were 
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responsible for diversion of plan assets held by the Fund.1
 
  
For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the judgment of 
the District Court and remand for additional factual findings. 
I.  
A.  Procedural History 
Background 
In April 2005, the Secretary brought this action for 
breach of fiduciary duty against Holloway, Doyle, the 
PITWU Fund, and two other defendants, Michael Garnett and 
Mark Maccariella.  The Secretary’s complaint alleged that 
PITWU had established a health benefit plan that was a 
“multi-employer welfare arrangement” (MEWA) governed by 
ERISA.  Two companies, Privileged Care, Inc. (PCI) and 
NorthPoint PEO (NorthPoint or NP), enabled small 
businesses to obtain health benefits for their employees by 
enrolling the employees in the Fund, even though the 
employees never joined the union.  Privileged Care Marketing 
Group (PCMG) marketed this scheme to small businesses.  
Businesses that chose to enroll their employees in the Fund 
were required to make benefit payments to PCMG.  PCMG 
retained a portion of the payments as compensation and 
remitted the balance to PCI and NP.  PCI and NP also 
                                              
1 Another defendant in this action, Michael Garnett, 
did not appear at trial and the District Court entered a default 
judgment against him.  Garnett did not file a notice of appeal, 
but five months after the entry of judgment, he filed in this 
Court a pro se brief challenging the judgment.  Because 
Garnett’s appeal is untimely, we lack jurisdiction to consider 
it.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B); Bowles v. Russell, 551 
U.S. 205, 215 (2007). 
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retained a substantial portion of the payments as 
compensation and remitted the remainder to claims 
administrators established by the Fund.  The complaint 
alleged that these payments were assets of the Fund 
improperly diverted by PCI, NP, and PCMG and that PCI, NP 
and PCMG were required by ERISA to use the assets only for 
the purpose of defraying reasonable plan expenses for the 
benefit of plan participants.   
 
The complaint alleged that Garnett and Maccariella at 
various times owned and operated PCI and NorthPoint and 
were fiduciaries under ERISA because the payments they 
received from their business clients were assets of the Fund 
under their control.  Garnett and Maccariella allegedly 
breached their fiduciary duties to the Fund by using assets of 
the Fund for purposes other than defraying reasonable plan 
expenses for the benefit of plan participants.  The complaint 
similarly alleged that Doyle had owned and operated PCMG 
and that he was a fiduciary because he exercised discretionary 
control over payments that were assets of the Fund. It further 
alleged that Doyle had breached his fiduciary duties to the 
Fund by improperly using plan assets for his own benefit.  
Finally, the complaint alleged that Holloway was a named 
trustee of the Fund, had breached her fiduciary duties to the 
Fund, and was liable both directly and as a co-fiduciary for 
failing to detect and prevent the diversion of Fund assets by 
Garnett, Maccariella, and Doyle.  The complaint sought 
restitution of losses to the plan, a permanent injunction 
against any of the defendants serving as a fiduciary or service 
provider to an ERISA plan, appointment of an independent 
fiduciary to manage the Fund, an accounting, costs, and other 
appropriate equitable relief.   
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After extensive discovery, the case proceeded to a 
bench trial in October 2009.  Solis v. Doyle, No. 05-2264, 
2010 WL 2671984 *3 (D.N.J. June 30, 2010).  At the 
beginning of the trial, Maccariella accepted a consent 
judgment enjoining him from serving as fiduciary or service 
provider to an ERISA plan and requiring him to pay 
$195,317.  A default judgment was entered against Garnett at 
the close of trial because he failed to appear at trial “[d]espite 
numerous continuances granted at his request.”   
 
B.  The District Court’s Findings 
The District Court made the following factual findings 
based on the bench trial.  In 2000, David Weinstein 
established PITWU.  Holloway owned and operated 
Employers Depot, Inc. (EDI), a professional employer 
organization (PEO) that she had established in 1989.2
                                              
2A professional employer organization (PEO) provides 
human resources and administrative services to business 
clients – typically small to medium size businesses – and 
often handles its clients’ payroll, workers’ compensation, and 
health and retirement benefits.  See generally United States v. 
Jennings, 599 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2010); Tri-State 
Emp’t Servs., Inc. v. Mountbatten Sur. Co., Inc., 295 F.3d 
256, 263 (2d Cir. 2002).  PEOs often arrange with their 
clients to be considered as co-employers of their clients’ 
employees to facilitate management of human resource 
functions for their clients.   
  At 
some point in 2000, she learned of PITWU from a health 
insurance broker.  An attorney, Neil Goldstein, who later 
became counsel to the Fund, provided Holloway with 
verification of PITWU’s union status.  On May 1, 2001, 
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Holloway and three other trustees established the PITWU 
Fund by an Agreement and Declaration of Trust.  The Fund 
initially had two employer members, EDI and Employers 
Consortium, Inc. (ECI).  The EDI and ECI employees were 
enrolled as participants in the Fund.  The Trust Agreement 
obligated EDI and ECI to make regular contributions to the 
Fund for each of their employees covered by the Fund.  The 
Fund made annual filings with the federal government, had 
trustees, counsel, an actuary, and claims administrators.  The 
District Court found that counsel for the Fund never 
expressed a concern that PITWU was not a valid union or that 
the Fund was not a valid multi-employer fund.   
 
1.  PCI/NP and PCMG 
In January 2002, ECI terminated its relationship with 
PITWU.  PCI and NP then became employer members of the 
PITWU Fund.  PCI and NP entered into identical collective 
bargaining agreements (CBA) with PITWU in which they 
agreed to make contributions to the Fund so that their 
employees could receive health benefits under the Fund.3
                                              
3“PCI and [NP] were effectively the same organization 
in that they shared consultants, office space, owners, and 
employees.”  Id. at *4. 
  
The CBAs provided that PITWU had “been designated by a 
majority of employees in certain client companies of 
[PCI/NP] as their exclusive bargaining representative for 
those terms and conditions of employment controlled by 
[PCI/NP] as per its ‘client Service Agreement.’”  The “client 
Service Agreement” referred to a PEO Services Contract, 
which was executed by clients of PCI/NP who wished to 
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obtain health benefits for their employees.4   Once an 
employer executed the contract and began making 
contribution payments, its employees would become 
members of the PITWU union and obtain access to health 
benefits from the Fund.  Although the contract allowed clients 
to choose not to join the PITWU union, clients were required 
to select the union option to obtain health benefits for their 
employees through PCI/NP’s CBAs with the Fund.  
Similarly, the contract listed a number of additional PEO 
services, but the only service consistently offered by PCI/NP 
was health benefits through the PITWU Fund.5
 
   
After PCI/NP became an employer member of the 
Fund, Holloway and another trustee appointed Weinstein as a 
trustee of the Fund.  Later in May, Weinstein sold PCI/NP to 
                                              
4PCI/NP’s PEO Services Contract contained a co-
employment clause stating that PCI or NP “and Client shall 
be considered co-employers for those employees provided to 
the Client by [PCI or NP] (designated employees) for . . . 
purposes” of compliance with certain federal civil rights laws, 
ERISA, and the Federal Drug Free Workplace Act or any 
state equivalent.   
5 PCI/NP attempted at some point to offer payroll 
services—payment of employees’ checks and payment of 
payroll taxes—but one business owner that selected this 
service testified at trial that he discontinued it after several 
months because PCI/NP had failed to make the necessary tax 
payments, subjecting the business to significant penalties.   
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Garnett, resigned as trustee, and was replaced by Garnett.6
 
   
 
 
 
 
Doyle’s company, PCMG, marketed the services of a 
variety of entities, including PCI/NP.7  In January of 2002, 
ariety of entities, including PCI/NP.8  In January of 2002, 
Doyle signed a Marketing Service Agreement with PCI, in 
which PCMG agreed to market PCI’s services for a fee.  
PCMG also collected payments from PCI/NP’s clients.  
Clients made payments by two checks, one to PCI/NP for 
participation in the Fund (Check 1), and one to PCMG for 
administrative service fees (Check 2).  PCMG received both 
checks and would forward the first on to PCI/NP.  It retained 
the second check to cover its expenses, which included sales 
commissions paid to PCMG’s sales consultants and fees for 
additional services selected by the client, such as gap 
insurance.9
                                              
6 Garnett operated the company until August 2002, 
when Maccariella took over.  Maccariella operated 
PCI/NorthPoint until it ceased operations in March 2003.  
  PCMG also provided monthly reports to PCI/NP 
7 PCI/NP did not market its services exclusively 
through PCMG.  For example, Weinstein’s wife also brought 
a number of clients to PCI/NorthPoint.   
8 PCI/NP did not market its services exclusively 
through PCMG.  For example, Weinstein’s wife also brought 
a number of clients to PCI/NorthPoint.   
9 Gap insurance is purchased to cover potential gaps in 
insurance coverage, for example when an employee is 
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regarding funds received and paid certain union dues.   
 
At some point, PCMG stopped marketing for PCI/NP, 
but continued to provide billing and administrative services 
until May 2003.  PCMG received $4.5 million in Check 1 
funds, and $2.1 million in Check 2 funds.10  PCMG 
forwarded $3.1 million of the Check 1 funds to PCI/NP, and 
paid $645,000 directly to claim administrators and medical 
providers.11
                                                                                                     
between jobs.  PCMG made between $20,000 and $33,000 in 
payments for gap insurance.  Id. at *4 n.4.  
  In addition to the $3.1 million received from 
PCMG, PCI/NP also directly received $816,000 from 
employers enrolled in the Fund through Weinstein’s wife.  Of 
this roughly $3.9 million, PCI/NP sent $2.1 million to claims 
administrators to pay employee health benefit claims.  Thus, 
in total, PCMG and PCI/NP collected $7.4 million in 
payments relating to the Fund, but only $2.7 million was sent 
to claim administrators for the payment of health benefit 
claims.  The remaining $4.7 million was retained by PCMG 
or PCI/NP. 
10 Doyle testified that PCMG made a net profit of 
$112,788.13.  A substantial portion of the Check 2 monies 
was used to pay PCMG’s sales consultants, who received 
$1.3 million in total (although not all of this money was 
related to promotion of PCI/NorthPoint).   
11 The record before the District Court indicates that 
this $645,000 was sent after November 2002.  At that time, 
PCI/NorthPoint stopped making required contributions to the 
Fund and Doyle was instructed by Fund’s trustees to send 
Check 1 monies directly to claims administrators.   
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2.  Management of the Fund 
 
The Fund retained a third-party claims administrator to 
pay health benefit claims by employees covered by the Fund.  
The Fund’s first claims administrator was Union Privileged 
Care (UPC), which was owned by Weinstein.  Oak Tree 
Administrators (Oak Tree) replaced UPC as claims 
administrator and served in that capacity from March to June 
of 2002.12  In a meeting with Oak Tree in April 2002, 
Holloway learned of many pending claims and of Oak Tree’s 
concern that claims may not have been paid since November 
2001.  In May 2002, Oak Tree reported that it had still not 
obtained necessary documents and financial information from 
UPC and therefore could not provide the trustees with a 
financial report; moreover, the Fund’s actuary could not 
perform a study on the financial condition of the Fund.  
Holloway also decided in May 2002 to appoint Weinstein as 
trustee of the Fund despite “general concerns” she had about 
him.  On September 20, 2002, the Fund’s new claims 
administrator, Brokerage Concepts, Inc., informed Holloway 
of problems relating to lack of funding because of PCI/NP’s 
failure to make contributions to the Fund and other problems 
arising from inadequate paperwork.13
                                              
12 A claims administrator is an entity that processes 
employee benefit claims to ensure that they are legitimate and 
consistent with plan documents, and then arranges for 
payment of valid claims.   
   
13 The District Court’s opinion uses Benefits Concepts, 
Inc. and Brokerage Concepts, Inc. interchangeably.  
Holloway referred to the entity as Brokerage Concepts and 
we follow her usage.  In December 2002, Southern Plan 
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These problems were illustrated by the testimony of 
five business owners who had obtained access to the Fund 
through PCI/NP.  They testified that they had difficulty 
presenting claims and did not have claims paid to their 
satisfaction.  Additionally, several of these witnesses testified 
that they did not consider their employees unionized or part 
of the PITWU union.  One employer was assured by PITWU 
union officials that PITWU brought small businesses “under 
its umbrella for purposes of medical benefits and payroll, but 
that there was no interest in unionizing the employees.”14
 
   
In response to these problems, Holloway asked 
Goldstein, the Fund’s attorney, “to bring some accountability 
to the Fund, but he asked [Holloway] to talk to the trustees 
about that.”  She also asked Goldstein to obtain membership 
information from PCI.  However, Holloway did not seek 
mediation of disputes with other trustees regarding the 
management of the Fund or seek to remove any trustee.15
                                                                                                     
Administrators replaced Brokerage Concepts, Inc. as claims 
administrator for the Fund.   
  
Nor did she demand an audit of PCI/NP or PCMG or contact 
the Department of Labor to complain about the lack of 
funding, lack of financial accountability, or “chaotic state of 
14 It is not clear whether the District Court credited this 
testimony; it did note, however, that the Secretary had not 
presented any signed enrollment forms establishing that the 
employees of these businesses were enrolled in the Fund.   
15The District Court did not describe Holloway’s 
disputes with several of the trustees, but Holloway’s 
resignation letter refers to these disputes.   
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affairs.”  Instead, on September 27, 2002, Holloway resigned 
as trustee.  She identified several reasons leading to her 
resignation, including the lack of financial accountability for 
contributions to the Fund and resulting lack of funding to pay 
claims.  She described the “vulnerability of the Fund due to 
actions taken by membership that has created insolvency of 
the Fund.”  Holloway also noted that several states had issued 
cease and desist orders “based on the representation by other 
membership/trustees that PITWU [was] an insurance 
program.”16
 
   
Holloway continued to participate in the 
administration of the Fund after her resignation.  In October 
2002, for example, Holloway met with Brokerage Concepts 
to discuss the Fund’s lack of funding.  She agreed that 
contribution rates should be increased.  EDI, Holloway’s 
company, used its own funds to satisfy claims by its clients’ 
employees that were not paid by the Fund.  Holloway also 
sought to resolve outstanding claims with health care 
providers and sought payment of claims from Southern Plan 
Administrators.   
 
3. The District Court’s Conclusions 
The District Court concluded that the Secretary had 
failed to show that Holloway or Doyle breached their 
fiduciary duties to the Fund.  Although the Secretary argued 
at length that funds collected by PCI/NP were plan assets 
                                              
16 The Fund’s attorney would draft responses to these 
orders stating, as Holloway put it, “this is a union-sponsored 
plan, it is not insurance, you state commissioners don't have 
jurisdiction over this.”   
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governed by ERISA, the court did not make any findings of 
facts or conclusions of law as to which of the monies received 
by PCI/NP and PCMG – if any – were plan assets.  Instead, 
the court focused on whether the Secretary had established 
that necessary contributions had not been made to the Fund or 
that the Fund had unpaid claims when it closed on May 2003.  
The court noted the Secretary’s concession that she did “not 
allege that defendant Holloway failed to collect contributions 
from employers” and the testimony of the Secretary’s 
summary witness that none of the financial analyses 
presented by the Secretary would have indicated to an 
observer that the Fund was underfunded.  The court also 
noted Doyle’s unrefuted testimony that the fees charged by 
PCI/NP and PCMG were customary and reasonable, and 
observed that the Secretary introduced no evidence that the 
fees charged by PCI/NP or PCMG “were excessive, 
unreasonable, or contrary to plan documents. 
 
C.   Additional Evidence 
In addition to the District Court’s factual findings, we 
summarize additional evidence in the record that we find 
relevant to our legal analysis. 
 
1. PCI/NP’s Evasion of State Insurance 
Regulation 
 
We find significant the cease and desist orders issued 
by insurance commissioners of seven states against PCI/NP, 
PCMG, Doyle, and in some cases, the PITWU Fund and 
Holloway.  Some regulatory background is necessary to 
understand the significance of these orders.  Providing and 
selling insurance, including health insurance, is generally 
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regulated by the states.  See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. 
Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002).  Certain self-insured 
employer and union plans that are subject to ERISA’s 
funding, vesting, and fiduciary standards are exempted from 
state insurance regulation.17  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(a), 
1144(b)(2)(B).  However, health insurance plans involving 
multiple employers are deemed “multi-employer welfare 
arrangements” (MEWAs) under ERISA, see 29 U.S.C. § 
1002(40)(A), and are subject both to ERISA standards and to 
state insurance regulation, see id. § 1144(b)(6).  Nevertheless, 
certain union-sponsored health insurance plans covering 
union members working for multiple different employers are 
excepted from the definition of MEWA and thus remain 
exempt from state insurance regulation.18
 
  See 29 U.S.C. § 
1002(40)(A)(i).  It is not disputed that the Fund was a 
MEWA, and therefore subject both to ERISA standards and 
to state insurance regulation.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(6).   
The record illustrates that, even though the Fund was 
properly considered a MEWA and therefore subject to state 
insurance regulation, PCI /NP and PCMG marketed the Fund 
as a self-insured union sponsored plan, exempted from state 
regulation.  This connection to the union was reinforced by a 
form that PCI/NP required its clients to sign entitled 
                                              
17This rough summary of ERISA’s complex 
preemption scheme is provided only as background.  See 
Moran, 536 U.S. at 364-65 (noting complexity of ERISA’s 
preemption scheme). 
18In 2003, the Department of Labor promulgated 
regulations setting forth criteria for bona fide union health 
and retirement plans.  See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-40. 
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“Professional Industrial Trade Workers Union Health & 
Welfare Fund Plan “B” Disclosure Form,” which stated: 
 
This health & welfare plan is sponsored by the 
Professional Industrial Trade Workers Union 
(P.I.T.W.U.).  The plan is self-funded and 
exempt from state regulation, as outlined in the 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) of 1974.  The plan is under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Secretary of 
Labor.  This plan is not regulated by any state 
department of insurance.  The plan being self-
funded is not covered by any state or federal 
guarantee fund in the event of fund insolvency. 
PCI/NP and PCMG thus relied on the Fund’s relationship 
with PITWU to claim that ERISA exempted the Fund, and 
their marketing of the Fund, from state regulation. 
 
From the outset, this scheme attracted the scrutiny of 
state insurance regulators.  In January 2002, less than a month 
after PCI/NP and PCMG were created, the Oklahoma 
Insurance Commissioner entered a cease and desist order 
against PCI, PCMG, and two of its marketing affiliates, 
finding that they were engaging in the unauthorized sale of 
insurance and ordering them to cease and desist from any 
further sales or marketing of insurance in the state.19
 
   
In June 2002, the Louisiana Insurance Commissioner 
issued a cease and desist order based on its finding that PCI 
                                              
19 The record contains a certified mail slip showing 
that this order was received by PCMG on February 4, 2002.   
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and PCMG were selling health insurance without 
authorization.  The Louisiana Commissioner found that PCI 
purported to offer PEO services, including health benefits, to 
its clients.  PCI “allegedly assumes the role of ‘co-employer’ 
to the employees of its client employers” and thereby 
provided these employees access to the Fund, pursuant to a 
CBA between PCI and the Fund.  However, the 
Commissioner found, inter alia, that  
 
[T]here is no collective bargaining for wages or 
improved working conditions as in a bona fide 
union agreement. . . . Employees of the 
employers contracting with PCI . . . do not 
directly join the union, and receive no 
representation or benefit from PITWU other 
than access to the union sponsored health plan.  
One “employer” from Louisiana who contracted 
with PCI and enrolled in the health and welfare 
fund did not include employees or activate any 
PEO services other than the health benefits. 
The Commissioner concluded that PITWU was a self-
insurance plan covering employees of multiple employers and 
had not acquired the necessary authorization to sell insurance 
in Louisiana.20
                                              
20ERISA exempts from state insurance regulation 
certain self-insured employee health benefit plans maintained 
by a single employer for its employees or by a union for its 
members.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(a), 1144(a)-(b).  Benefit 
plans established for employees of multiple employers, 
however, are not exempted from state regulation.  See id. § 
1144(b)(6). 
  The Commissioner summarized several of 
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PCI, PCMG, and their affiliates’ marketing practices as 
follows: 
 
The individuals and entities named above have 
been involved directly or indirectly in making, 
issuing, circulating, or causing to be made, 
issued, or circulated written and oral statements 
in the form of sales presentations and marketing 
materials used to solicit potential marketing 
agents and prospective client employers for PCI 
by, 1) misrepresenting to the public, and on an 
official document filed with the Louisiana 
Department of Insurance, that the PITWU or 
Privilege Care Employee Health and Welfare 
Fund is not insurance and therefore exempt 
from regulation under state laws governing 
insurance and insurance agents; 2) deceptively 
claiming that PCI’s “health benefit services” 
have been approved by the Louisiana 
Department of Insurance; 3) falsely claiming 
that a [sic] official representative of the 
Louisiana Department of Insurance had been 
invited and wanted to attend a “compliance and 
training” meeting held by PCMG and PCI in 
Louisiana on May 16, 2002; and 4) falsely 
claiming that PCI had been licensed by the 
Louisiana Department of Labor as a PEO doing 
business in this state; 5) falsely representing 
that PCMG had not been issued a cease and 
desist order prior to April 20, 2002; and 6) 
violating several prohibitory laws of this state. 
The Commissioner accordingly ordered PCI, PCMG, the 
19 
 
PITWU Fund, Weinstein, Doyle, Garnett, Oak Tree 
Administrators, and several affiliates to cease and desist from 
marketing or providing health care services in the state.   
By the time the Fund ceased operations in May 2003, 
five other states – North Carolina, Texas, Massachusetts, 
Colorado, and Illinois – had entered similar orders against 
PCI/NP, the PITWU Fund, PCMG, Doyle, and others.  
Several of these orders were based on hearings before state 
insurance commissioners at which it emerged that, as in 
Louisiana, PCI/NP purported to offer PEO services but 
actually offered almost exclusively health benefits through 
the Fund by enabling its clients’ employees to obtain health 
benefits from the Fund without union membership.  Several 
of the later cease and desist orders also noted that the Fund 
had numerous unpaid claims -- for example, Colorado’s 
Insurance Commissioner noted that as of December 9, 2002, 
the Fund had over $7 million in unpaid claims.   
 
The findings of these insurance commissioners are 
corroborated by the record before the District Court.  
Evidence showed that PCI/NP required its clients to sign a 
disclosure form in which it falsely represented that the 
PITWU Fund was “exempt from state regulation, as outlined 
in the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
of 1974.”  At the bench trial, five managers whose businesses 
contracted with PCI/NP testified that their employees were 
not unionized.  One witness stated that he had been assured 
by PITWU officials that the union had no interest in 
unionizing employees – it was merely a means of providing 
health insurance and other benefits.  The business owners also 
testified to serious problems resulting from unpaid claims for 
health benefits from the Fund.  Financial data presented by 
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the Secretary supports this testimony, showing that the Fund 
had $7.6 million in unpaid claims on October 31, 2002. 
 
 
Both Doyle and Holloway were aware of at least some 
of the cease and desist orders.  Doyle had contact with 
insurance commissioners in some states and participated in 
some of the related proceedings.21  He is named in each of the 
orders, and in several cases the record contains certified mail 
slips confirming that he or PCMG received copies of the 
orders.22
                                              
21The Louisiana Insurance Commissioner noted that 
Doyle had falsely represented in filings before the 
Commission that PCMG had not been “subject to regulatory 
action including cease and desist orders, revocations of 
license, or similar actions,” even though PCMG had received 
a cease and desist order from the Oklahoma Insurance 
Commission only two months before filing its application.   
  Holloway also learned of some of the cease and 
desist orders while serving as trustee, mentioning them in her 
resignation letter as one of her reasons for resigning.  But the 
extent of her knowledge about the orders is unclear, and the 
22Although not clearly related to this case, on October 
27, 2007, Doyle pleaded guilty to a felony violation of Texas 
laws against selling unauthorized insurance, was sentenced to 
five years of community supervision, and agreed to pay 
$380,788.39 in restitution to unspecified victims.  The 
indictment to which Doyle pleaded guilty is not included in 
the record, however, and the judgment of conviction states 
that the offense was committed on February 1, 2001, several 
months before the Fund was created and nearly a year before 
PCMG began marketing for PCI/NP.  
21 
 
orders with the most troubling findings were issued after her 
resignation.  As the District Court found, the Fund’s attorney 
assured Holloway that he would respond to these orders, 
arguing that “this is a union-sponsored plan, it is not 
insurance, you state commissioners don’t have jurisdiction 
over this.”   
 
We find it significant that PCI/NP’s promotion of the 
Fund bears striking similarities to the type of scheme that 
ERISA’s MEWA provisions were specifically designed to 
prevent:  an aggressively marketed, but inadequately funded 
health benefit plan masquerading as an ERISA-exempt plan 
in order to evade the solvency controls imposed by state 
insurance regulation.23
                                              
23 See Legislative Hearing on Pension Issues, Hearing 
on Hr. 1641, H.R. 3632, H.R. 6462 Before the Subcomm. on 
Labor-Management Relations of the H Comm. on Education 
and Labor, 97th Cong. 1-2 (1982) (statement of Rep. Burton 
explaining that MEWA amendments were made to prevent 
“fraudulent” insurance trusts from using ERISA preemption 
to sell health insurance to small businesses without 
“comply[ing] with the basic solvency controls which each 
State establishes to protect health care consumers”). 
  Although the record is not entirely 
Although the Secretary claims that PITWU was a 
“bogus” union, we think this claim is too strong.  The record 
shows that the CBAs between PITWU and PCI/NorthPoint 
were bogus – they were not the result of bona fide collective 
bargaining, and the employees it enrolled in the union by 
PCI/NorthPoint were not genuine union members – but no 
similar evidence was presented concerning the CBAs between 
PITWU and its other employer members, ECI and EDI. 
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clear on this point, it appears that the ultimate result of this 
arrangement was that which Congress feared:  the Fund was 
ultimately unable to pay all employee claims, and thus 
employees participating in the Fund were not provided 
promised health benefits.24
 
  Doyle and Holloway were not the 
principal architects of this scheme, and the question presented 
by this case is the extent of their awareness of the scheme and 
liability for its consequences.  But we think it is important to 
keep the nature of the scheme firmly in mind. 
2.  Holloway’s Management of the Fund and 
Subsequent Resignation 
 
We also find relevant some additional details 
concerning Holloway’s management of the Fund.  It appears 
from the record that Holloway first learned of problems with 
the management of the Fund in a meeting in April 2002 with 
the Fund’s claims administrator at that time, Oak Tree 
Administrators, and the Fund’s trustees.  The meeting 
minutes, prepared by Holloway, report that: 
 
                                              
24The District Court noted that the Secretary did not 
submit enrollment forms and establish that there were valid 
participant benefit claims that should have been paid pursuant 
to the plan documents and noted that “there was no testimony 
to the effect that as of the date of the closure of the PITWU 
Fund in May 2003, there were any claims unpaid by the 
Fund.”  We do not disturb this finding, but simply note that it 
is highly unlikely that all $7 million in unpaid employee 
claims as of December 2002 were invalid claims; or that the 
Fund somehow managed to pay all valid, outstanding claims 
before closing in May 2003. 
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It was discussed that several boxes of unpaid 
claims had been shipped from Union Privilege 
and that Oak Tree was inputting all the claims 
to determine the magnitude of requirements.  It 
was noted that many claims were very old and 
dated back to mid 2001 with no claims 
reflecting payment since November 2001.  
Cindy Holloway requested a date for the all 
[sic] claims to be entered into the data base.  
Oak Tree advised that this would be completed 
by the following Tuesday, April 30. 
The Fund’s actuary reported that he had not been paid by 
UPC and was owed $10,000; the trustees authorized payment 
of the bill.  The trustees also learned in the meeting that two 
new health benefit plans – i.e., new types of coverage with 
different pricing schemes – had been added to the Fund by 
PCI/NP without their approval.  One of the trustees, Dante 
Georeno, observed that “he didn’t see a problem with the 
plans, although the premium rates were very low, because the 
plans have limited coverage.  The plans were already in use 
and the [summary plan descriptions] already in the hands of 
the membership.  It was therefore determined the plans would 
be continued.”  Additionally, Oak Tree noted that enrollment 
applications submitted by PCI/NP were not complete.  A 
week after this meeting, Holloway and the other trustees 
agreed to appoint Weinstein, the owner and operator of UPC 
and PCI/NP, as a trustee of the Fund.25
                                              
25Holloway did not investigate Weinstein’s 
qualifications before agreeing to appoint him.  But at some 
point prior to resigning as trustee, Holloway learned from the 
Fund’s attorney that Weinstein had been the subject of a 
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The trustees held another meeting on May 30, 2002.  A 
draft of the minutes from the meeting prepared by the Fund’s 
attorney indicates that Weinstein resigned at that meeting and 
was replaced by Garnett, who succeeded him as owner and 
operator of PCI/NP.  The Fund’s accountant informed the 
trustees that he could not prepare a financial statement for the 
Fund because certain financial information he had requested 
from UPC had not yet been provided.  The Fund’s actuary 
reported to the trustees that he had received some information 
from Weinstein but was still missing necessary information 
about the number of claims for prescription benefits 
submitted by plan participants and the number of participants 
enrolled per plan per month.  Without this data, he was unable 
to offer an opinion as to whether the Fund’s “reserves were 
adequate to meet its ongoing needs.”  Oak Tree also reported 
that it was awaiting additional information from Weinstein 
and UPC.  Weinstein then joined the trustees’ meeting and 
they developed a list of information that Weinstein would 
provide; the trustees directed UPC and Oak Tree to provide 
all necessary data to the Fund’s accountant and actuary within 
two weeks.  According to Holloway, the Fund’s attorney sent 
Weinstein a letter after the meeting to confirm the request for 
information.   
 
On September 20, 2002, Holloway learned from the 
Fund’s latest claims administrator, Brokerage Concepts, that 
it was having problems paying claims because PCI/NP had 
stopped making contributions to the Plan and that necessary 
                                                                                                     
cease and desist order from the state of Florida in connection 
with an organization called “NAPT.”  Holloway could not 
recall whether she learned this before or after agreeing to 
appoint him as trustee to the Fund.   
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information and paperwork from PCI/NorthPoint was lacking.  
The District Court found that (1) Holloway instructed the 
Fund’s attorney “to bring some accountability to the Fund, 
but he asked [Holloway] to talk to the trustees about that,” 
and (2) Holloway “took steps to try to get membership 
information from PCI.”  It is not clear from the record 
whether Holloway followed up on these requests before 
submitting her resignation letter on September 27, 2002.26
 
   
Holloway’s resignation letter enumerated 15 specific 
reasons for resigning, which she explained were “examples 
and are not representative of all the issues related to my 
resignation.”  Many of these reasons related to disagreements 
with other trustees about their approach to Fund management.  
For example, she strongly disagreed with the other trustees’ 
dismissal of Oak Tree Administrators without consulting her.  
Her reasons for resigning also included:  
 
e. Lack of continuity or communication by the 
Union representatives. 
 
f. No financial accountability for contributions 
to the Health and Welfare Fund by other 
membership.  Employers Depot [Holloway’s 
company] provided monthly audits and 
accountability since the inception of the 
program. 
 
g. Lack of proper follow through to ensure that 
                                              
26The letter is dated September 20, 2002, and is not 
signed, but Holloway stipulated that she submitted the letter 
to the other Fund trustees on September 27, 2002.   
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Union Privilege provided required financial 
records to the accountants and actuary that 
determined the financial solvency of the fund. 
 
 
h. Establishment of two additional plans 
without the consent of the Trustees. 
 
i. Contribution rates established for two 
additional plans without the expressed consent 
of the Trustees or approval by actuary. 
 
j.  Vulnerability of the fund due to actions taken 
by membership that has created insolvency of 
the fund. 
 
k. The consensual approach by the PITWU to 
allow staff of certain membership to make 
decisions, develop programs and direct the 
outcome of contracts and TPA activity. 
 
l.  Cease and desist orders in multiple states 
based on the representation by other 
membership/Trustees that PITWU is an 
insurance program. 
 
m. Legal issues with the Department of 
Insurance in multiple states due to the 
representation by other membership that 
PITWU is an insurance program. 
 
n.  Lack of follow through by responsible 
parties to ensure the structure, insurance 
27 
 
programs and related requirements are managed 
timely and effectively. 
 Holloway expressed concern about “the chaotic state 
of affairs of the Fund,” which had “brought undue damage in 
multiple states, created credit damage to the membership due 
to claims that are in excess of 9 months old and generally has 
ruined the credibility of the Union and its associated 
fiduciaries.”  Holloway did not find another person to replace 
her as trustee before resigning, nor was she immediately 
replaced.27
 
   
III.   
 
Discussion 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and we have jurisdiction of this 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In considering an 
appeal from a bench trial, we “review the District Court’s 
findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de 
novo.”28
                                              
27 Tim Foster was later appointed a trustee of the Fund.  
It is not clear from the record whether Holloway ever 
communicated her concerns to Foster or whether Foster ever 
read her resignation letter. 
  Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Ins. Co. of North 
Am., 609 F.3d 143, 156 (3d Cir. 2010) (brackets omitted).   
28 Holloway moved for a directed verdict at the close 
of the bench trial and the District Court mistakenly styled its 
opinion as a ruling on a directed verdict under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
50.  Because there was no jury trial in this case, we treat the 
court’s decision as a ruling on partial findings of fact under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 and review it accordingly.  See Fed. Ins. 
Co. v. HPSC, Inc., 480 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2007). 
28 
 
 
A.  Determination of Plan Assets 
The Secretary urges in this appeal that the District 
Court erred in failing to determine whether payments 
collected by PCI/NP and PCMG were plan assets subject to 
ERISA.  We agree.  The identification of plan assets in this 
case determines ERISA’s reach.  If, as the Secretary claims, 
all of the money collected from employers by PCI/NP and 
PCMG were plan assets from the moment of collection, then 
Doyle may be a fiduciary by virtue of exercising control over 
those assets, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i), and, if he is a 
fiduciary, he and Holloway may be liable for breaching their 
fiduciary duties with respect to those assets.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1104(a), 1105(a), 1109(a).  But if, as Doyle and Holloway 
claim, the payments collected by PCI/NP and PCMG were 
not plan assets, and the only assets of the Fund were those 
payments received by the Fund’s claims administrators, then 
Doyle did not handle any plan assets, and could not be a 
fiduciary under ERISA, and Holloway’s duties as a fiduciary 
were not implicated by PCI/NP’s and PCMG’s disposition of 
the payments they collected from employers. 
 
1. Doyle’s Fiduciary Status 
Identification of plan assets is essential to determining 
Doyle’s fiduciary status.  Under ERISA, even if a person is 
not named as a fiduciary in plan documents, he may still be “a 
fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent . . . he . . . 
exercises any authority or control respecting management or 
disposition of its assets . . . .”  29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i); 
see also Board of Trustees of Teamsters Local 863 Pension 
Fund v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  
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The Secretary argues that Doyle was a fiduciary because all 
or part of the payments that PCMG collected from PCI/NP’s 
clients were plan assets and Doyle, as head of PCMG, 
exercised discretionary control over those assets.  Doyle 
contends that the payments PCMG collected from employers 
who enrolled their employees in the Fund were not plan 
assets and that the only plan assets were funds remitted to the 
Fund’s claim administrators pursuant to the collective 
bargaining agreements between PITWU and PCI/NP.   
 
The District Court, however, made no findings as to 
which, if any, of the monies under Doyle’s control were plan 
assets, or whether Doyle was a fiduciary.  Instead, the District 
Court appears to have concluded that Doyle could not have 
breached any fiduciary duties he might have owed to the 
Fund based on (1) his testimony that he forwarded all 
required Check 1 monies, and (2) his testimony that the 
Check 2 monies he collected as marketing fees were 
“customary” and the absence of evidence that the fees were 
“excessive, unreasonable, or contrary to plan documents.”  
Doyle, 2010 WL 2671984 *7-8.  Both of these conclusions 
are problematic.   
 
First, the District Court’s findings cast doubt on 
Doyle’s testimony that he forwarded all required Check 1 
monies.  The court found that Doyle had collected $4.5 
million in Check 1 monies, of which $3.1 million was 
forwarded to PCI/NP and $645,000 was sent directly to the 
Fund’s claim administrator pursuant to instructions from the 
Fund’s trustees after PCI/NP stopped making contributions in 
November 2002.  Doyle, 2010 WL 2671984 *4.  But this 
leaves $755,000 of the $4.5 million collected by Doyle 
unaccounted for.  Doyle’s claim that he properly forwarded 
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all required Check 1 monies cannot be credited without 
addressing this $755,000 discrepancy between the amounts 
Doyle collected and the amounts he transmitted to PCI/NP or 
the Fund’s claims administrator.  In any case, the District 
Court would still need to determine whether Check 1 monies 
were plan assets and whether Doyle exercised sufficient 
control over those monies to be considered a fiduciary.  See 
In re Mushroom Transp. Co., Inc., 382 F.3d 325, 346-47 (3d 
Cir. 2004). 
 
Second, Doyle’s unrefuted testimony that the Check 2 
funds he collected for marketing fees were customary or 
reasonable does not mean that he did not violate any fiduciary 
duties under ERISA.  If Check 2 monies were plan assets and 
Doyle was a fiduciary, he was required to use these monies 
“for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to 
participants in the plan and their beneficiaries [and] defraying 
reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 
1104(a)(1)(A).  The Check 2 monies retained by PCMG were 
used to pay expenses it incurred in marketing the Fund.  It is 
far from obvious how plan participants benefitted from 
PCMG’s marketing of the Fund to other businesses with 
whom they had no connection or why the Fund would 
reasonably incur such expenses.  Moreover, as we have 
explained above, the “PEO services” of PCI/NP that PCMG 
was promoting were actually part of a scheme to abuse 
ERISA preemption and avoid state insurance regulations 
through a sham collective bargaining relationship with 
PITWU.  At a minimum, expenditures for marketing this 
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illegal scheme were not reasonable expenses for the benefit of 
plan participants.29
Accordingly, on remand, the District Court should 
make detailed factual findings concerning the nature of the 
funds received and controlled by Doyle to determine which, if 
any of these funds, were plan assets.  The court should 
specifically address whether Check 1 and Check 2 monies 
were “plan assets,” considering in particular those monies 
sent at the direction of the trustees directly to claims 
administrators.  If the District Court determines on remand 
that some or all of these monies are “plan assets,” it should 
then consider whether Doyle had sufficient control over these 
assets to support a finding of fiduciary status.  See In re 
Mushroom Transp. Co., Inc., 382 F.3d at 346-47.  If the 
District Court finds that Doyle is a fiduciary with respect to 
certain plan assets, it should then consider whether Doyle 
breached his fiduciary duties to the Fund.  See 29 C.F.R. § 
2509.75-8, FR-16; Bd. of Trs. of Teamsters Local 863 
Pension Fund v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 174 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
 
2. Holloway’s Liability 
The identification of plan assets is also important to 
the Secretary’s breach of fiduciary duty claims against 
Holloway.  It is undisputed that, as a trustee, Holloway was a 
                                              
29 The mere fact that activities violate applicable state 
or federal regulations does not mean that expenditures for 
such activities are automatically unreasonable or improper 
under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).  The expenditures at issue 
here are unusual because their principal purpose was to 
promote a scheme that improperly circumvented state and 
federal regulations designed to protect plan participants. 
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named fiduciary, and thus was obligated to discharge her 
duties to the Fund “with the care, skill, prudence, and 
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a 
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such 
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like 
character and with like aims.”  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).  
The Secretary primarily argues that Holloway failed to act 
prudently to prevent the improper diversion of Check 1 and 
Check 2 monies by PCI/NP and PCMG.  The District Court 
did not address this argument, however, apparently because it 
concluded that Holloway did not breach any fiduciary duties 
owed to the Fund.   
 
Holloway contends that “there was no evidence that 
Ms. Holloway acted in a way that caused the Fund to (i) fail 
to provide benefits to eligible participants or be underfunded, 
(ii) fail to defray costs, or (iii) fail to adhere to plan 
documents.”  That argument, however, only addresses some 
of the fiduciary duties enumerated in ERISA § 404(a), which 
is not an exhaustive list.30
                                              
30ERISA describes a fiduciary’s duties to a plan as 
follows:  
  See Glaziers & Glassworkers 
a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with 
respect to a plan in the interest of the 
participants and beneficiaries and -- 
(A) for the exclusive purpose of: 
(i) providing benefits to participants and 
their beneficiaries; and 
(ii) defraying the reasonable expenses of 
administering the plan; 
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Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Sec., 93 
F.3d 1171, 1180-81 (3d Cir. 1996).   
 
Rather, ERISA § 404(a) incorporates the fiduciary 
standards of trust law, of which several are relevant here.  See 
id. at 1180.  In particular, a trustee has a duty to maintain 
financial records and to preserve and protect the assets of the 
plan, including from diversion or embezzlement.  See 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§ 76(2)(b), 83; Ream v. Frey, 
107 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 1997).  Because the District Court 
did not resolve the question of plan assets, it did not address 
the Secretary’s arguments regarding the question of 
Holloway’s knowledge of asset diversion or her 
corresponding duties, if any.  Those arguments turn on close 
                                                                                                     
(B) with the care, skill, prudence and 
diligence under the circumstances then 
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would 
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like 
character and with like aims; 
(C) by diversifying the investments of the 
plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, 
unless under the circumstances it is clearly 
prudent not to do so; and  
(D) in accordance with the documents and 
instruments governing the plan insofar as such 
documents and instruments are consistent with 
the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter 
III of this chapter. 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).   
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questions of fact regarding what Holloway knew and could 
reasonably be expected to know.   
 
In addition, a trustee must also take prudent 
precautions, such as by providing for a “suitable and 
trustworthy replacement,” to ensure that his resignation does 
not harm the Fund or its beneficiaries.  See Ream, 107 F.3d at 
154.  Because the record does not indicate who replaced 
Holloway as trustee, it is unclear whether that person is 
“suitable and trustworthy.”      
 
Finally, when confronted with suspicious 
circumstances, a trustee may be required to investigate 
potential risks to a plan.  See Chao v. Merino, 452 F.3d 174 
(2d Cir. 2006).  The record indicates that Holloway took 
several steps to rectify recordkeeping problems.  The District 
Court failed, however, to address whether Holloway had a 
duty to investigate, how extensive an investigation would 
have been required, or whether an adequate investigation 
would have revealed the Fund’s potential insolvency and/or 
the diversion of assets.   
If Holloway has breached any of these duties, as the 
Secretary contends, then she may be liable for any resulting 
loss of plan assets.31
                                              
31The Secretary argues that Holloway is both directly 
liable for losses to the plan under ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 
1109, and liable as co-fiduciary under ERISA § 405(a), 29 
U.S.C. § 1105(a).  If the District Court finds that some of the 
Check 1 and/or Check 2 monies were plan assets and that 
Holloway breached her fiduciary duties, it should consider 
whether Holloway is liable for any resulting losses of plan 
assets under both theories.  Additionally, even if the District 
  The Secretary’s claims cannot be 
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evaluated, however, without first determining whether any of 
the Check 1 or Check 2 monies were plan assets that 
Holloway was obligated preserve.  Accordingly, as explained 
above, the District Court should make appropriate findings as 
to which, if any, of these monies were plan assets.  If on 
remand the District Court finds that any of the monies 
retained by PCMG or PCI/NP were plan assets, it should then 
consider whether Holloway breached her fiduciary duties 
relating to those assets and is liable for any resulting losses to 
the plan.  In considering Holloway’s fiduciary duties, the 
District Court should resolve the relevant questions of fact, 
including those raised above.  
 
B.  Identification of Plan Assets 
To facilitate the District Court’s analysis on remand, 
we provide the following guidance on identification of plan 
assets under ERISA.  The term “plan assets” is not 
comprehensively defined in ERISA or in the Secretary’s 
regulations.  ERISA provides that “the term ‘plan assets’ 
means plan assets as defined by such regulations as the 
Secretary may prescribe . . . .”32
                                                                                                     
Court finds that none of the Check 1 or Check 2 monies were 
plan assets, it should still consider whether Holloway 
breached any of the fiduciary duties discussed above, as such 
a finding is relevant to the injunctive relief sought by the 
Secretary. 
  29 U.S.C. § 1002(42).  The 
32The statute also establishes specific rules to 
determine when an entity’s assets become assets of a 
retirement plan by virtue of the plan’s ownership of an equity 
interest in the entity.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(42).   
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Secretary’s regulations define the scope of “plan assets” in 
two specific contexts:  (1) where an employee benefit plan 
invests assets by purchasing shares in a company, 29 C.F.R. § 
2510.3-101, and (2) where contributions to a plan are 
withheld by an employer from employees’ wages, 29 C.F.R. § 
2510.3-102.  The first regulation is not relevant here, and the 
second regulation does not apply because the Secretary has 
not presented any evidence that employer contributions to the 
Fund were withheld from the wages of employees 
participating in the Fund.  See In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 
1199 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 
As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
persuasively explained, in the absence of specific statutory or 
regulatory guidance, the term “plan assets” should be given 
its ordinary meaning, and therefore should be construed to 
refer to property owned by an ERISA plan.33
                                              
33Some courts have adopted a functional approach to 
defining plan assets, which considers “whether the item in 
question may be used to the benefit (financial or otherwise) of 
the fiduciary at the expense of plan participants or 
beneficiaries.”  Acosta v. Pac. Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 620 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (holding that list of shareholders held by plan was 
a plan asset).  Although this approach may be helpful when 
considering whether items other than cash or financial 
instruments are properly considered assets of an ERISA plan, 
the parties do not argue for its application in this case, and we 
do not think that it helps to determine which of the payments 
at issue here were assets of the Fund.  
  See In re Luna, 
406 F.3d at 1199 (considering dictionary definition of “asset” 
and noting that “[c]entral to the definition of ‘asset,’ then, is 
that the person or entity holding the asset has an ownership 
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interest in a given thing, whether tangible or intangible”).   
This approach is also consistent with guidance provided by 
the Secretary on the meaning of “plan assets,” which states 
that “the assets of a plan generally are to be identified on the 
basis of ordinary notions of property rights under non-ERISA 
law.  In general, the assets of a welfare plan would include 
any property, tangible or intangible, in which the plan has a 
beneficial ownership interest.”  Department of Labor, 
Advisory Op. No. 93-14A, 1993 WL 188473 *4 (May 5, 
1993); see also Kalda v. Sioux Valley Physician Partners, 
Inc., 481 F.3d 639, 647 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding “the 
Secretary’s reasoning in its rulings regarding ‘plan assets’ 
thorough, valid, and particularly consistent” and adopting the 
Secretary’s definition).34
 
 
As a general rule, the first step in identifying the 
property of an ERISA plan is to consult the documents 
establishing and governing the plan.  Cf. In re Lucent Death 
Benefits ERISA Litig., 541 F.3d 250, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2008).  
A court should then, in light of these documents, consult 
                                              
34The Supreme Court has also strongly suggested that 
this is the proper approach to defining “plan assets.”  See 
Jackson v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1307 (2009) (vacating 
Fourth Circuit’s holding that unpaid employer contributions 
were plan assets and remanding for further consideration “in 
light of the position asserted by the Solicitor General in his 
brief for the United States”); Brief for United States at 11-12, 
2009 WL 133443, at *11-*12, in Jackson v. United States 
(explaining that “in situations not covered by the plan asset 
regulations, ‘the assets of a plan generally are to be identified 
on the basis of ordinary notions of property rights under non-
ERISA law’”). 
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contracts to which the plan is a party or other documents 
establishing the rights of the plan.  See, e.g., Metzler v. 
Solidarity of Labor Organizations Health & Welfare Fund, 
No. 95-7247, 1998 WL 477964, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 
1998), aff’d 224 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam), cert. 
denied 533 U.S. 928 (2001); Galgay v. Gangloff, 677 F. 
Supp. 295, 301-02 (M.D. Pa. 1987), aff’d 932 F.2d 959 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  The Secretary further argues that representations 
made by PCI/NP and PCMG to businesses which purchased 
health benefits from the Fund should also be considered in 
determining what monies were assets of the Fund.  Given the 
District Court’s limited factual findings, we are reluctant to 
rule on this argument.  We merely note that such 
representations are relevant only to the extent that they affect 
the property rights of the Fund under ordinary property law 
principles.  We leave it to the District Court to determine on 
remand what representations were made and their relevance, 
if any, to the Fund’s property rights. 
 
IV.   
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
of the District Court in favor of Holloway and Doyle and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Conclusion 
